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Introduction
The issues under appeal at this time entertain a significant volume of
questionable candor of what constitutes a Mothers' inherent rights to her child
that she bore out of wedlock. The issues that are directly described in Appellant's
brief and any and all additional concerns represent a child custody dispute,
namely, Ariann Lucinda Child, bom August 9, 2004. Appellant is objecting to
the outcome of the April 2009 'Order.' Appellant has been forced to fight for her
rights from the time the child was 4 months old, just to maintain her motherhood
role. The following describes Appellant's cause of action.
Issues Contained in Appellant's Brief
In short format, the issues presented are directed as follows:
1. Did the Trial Court error in assuming that a substantial change of circumstances
did occur to substantiate a change of custody?
2. Did the Trial Court error in assigning the 'best interest of the child9 be granted to
Petitioner in consideration of all past unjust procedures, and failure to assign the
Utah State Guidelines that are foolproof for the majority of divorcing and
adjudicated children of parents who were never married?
3. Did the Trial Court ignore Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and cause Respondent
to suffer unexpected consequences without merit regarding loss of'natural'
parental rights'?
3

4. Did the trial Court error in causing torrential dramatic impact to the child by
influencing Petitioner to bear 4no responsibility' towards facilitating the preexisting relationship between the Respondent and the child considering that the
Court noted that Petitioner could very well afford these costs?
5. Did the Trial Court error by ineffectively applying their own decrees of which
distributed a losing battle for Respondent for all Attorney's fees involved in this
case from the initial 'Verified Petition for Paternity, Custody, and Related
Matters' which has both escalated to Appellant's appeal, and provided
momentum and has caused the impact enabling this appeal?
Appellant offers to consolidate relating issues for a more effective reply to
'Appellee's Brief within this 'Reply Brief.' For simplification purposes issues 2,
3, and 4 should be combined, as described above.
Relevant Reply Facts and Argument
Foremost, existing in Appellee's Reply Brief lies an argument of the
Appellants,' 'failure to follow proper briefing requirements.' (U.R. App. P. 24).
This argument contains (6 Vi) pages of Appellee's 'Reply Brief.' The Court of
Appeals' initial review of Appellee's objection was responded to on March 29,
2010. The Court of Appeals decided to proceed with the Appellant's Appeal and
deny a dismal of Appellant's Brief, from Appellee. This Court also recognized
Appellant's impecuniosities in relation to the additional argument noted in
4

'Appellee's Brief,' pertaining to the transcripts that granted the continuance of the
Appeal without the transcripts. These inept arguments, given the pre-existing
responses from this Court, are moot contained within 'Appellee's Brief
Appellant must muster all evidence and surface them to the Court for reference
and accuracy. Therefore, under the Appellees,' 'Statement of Facts,' the
following argumentative issues are believed to be without merit and credence, in
accordance, to the authorities and case law provided as follows:
1.'Child had argued that Globis had not had a stable job since the order of the decree
since the entry of the August 2007 'Order,' and could not afford rent, etc'
Stevens v. Collard, 863 P2d 534, 837 P.2d 593, ([8]), (Conclusions), (Ut. Ct.
App. 1992).
It is recognized that Respondent was self-employed from the first and
foremost 'Verified Petition for Paternity, on January 19, 2005,' and again on
'October 30, 2007.' Respondent's income was calculated at $883.00 per month,
and Petitioner's income was calculated at $5000.00 per month in the October
2007 'Order.' It was admitted into evidence on record of Petitioner's loans to
Respondent for rent, etc. that resulted in a $5100.00 Judgment for Petitioner in
the Oct. 30, 2007 'Order.' This is not a change of circumstance from the status of
Respondent's ever fluctuating income (or debt) over a given period of time, (Ex.
14 p.3 ]fl), as compared to Petitioner's. In question, what has been Petitioner's
5

recognizable income and debt throughout this custody battle, and is it equitable to
only focus on the custodial parents' debt, or wealth? (Connelle v. Connelle—
P.3d—, 2010 WL 2105190, (Ut. Ct. App. 2010). Hogge v. Hogge, 648 P.2d
5155, 638 P.2d 624, *628, (Ut. Ct. App. 2010). Particularily, given the fact that
Petitioner has been awarded primary physical custody since the April, 27 2009
'Order' and there had been no prior discovery for child support in adjusting the
custodial parent's income. (Utah Court of Appeals § 78B-12-102 (8), (9)), (Utah
Court of Appeals § 78B-12-203 (4)(a), (5)(a-c), (7)(a, b)).
From the first trial in 2007 that proposed child support at $509.00 per month;
also, granted Petitioner a Judgment for $5100.00 of debt from Respondent (Ex. 3,
'Findings of Halls' p.9 (21)), while refusing a plea for lack of arrearages for
Respondent for the first 3 1/2 years' of the child's life with no permissions to
pregnancy, or the (3) months, thereafter. (Ex. 7, p.8 8-17-07 Trial,' "nothing to
respondent in arrerages")), (U.R.C.P. 54 (b), (c)(1)), (U.R.C.P. 106). Respondent
never received a check for $509.00 as stated in the courtroom on August 17,
2007,' or $502.00 per month as indicated in the 'Order.' (Ex. 3, TindingsOlsen' p.2 (7)), (Utah Court of Appeals § 78B-12-203 (5)(a), (5)(c), (7)(b), (UCA
§30-3-3(1-3)).
The first order of deductions to child support was presented in the October 30,
2007 'Order' of $63.50 per month that reduced child support from $502.00, less
6

$63.50 for one half health care costs. (Ex. 3, 'Findings-Halls' p.7,8 (17)), (UCA
§ 30-3-5 (6), (7)). Intermittently in these years to date, child support was
deducted spontaneously by order's of automatic reductions of attorney's fees to
be re-collected by Petitioner from the July 9, 2008 hearing (recorded date of July
10, 2009 hearing) from the May 6, 2008 'Hearing.' (Ex. 7, 'Trial' p.14 of 22,
"the court will allow Mr. Childs to recover $438 at $50.00 per month'), (Ex. 8
'Order of Huegley' p.2 (3)). All of this caused a noteworthy impact on
Respondent and permissibly caused an inconsistent amount of child support to
which Respondent might be able to rely on to maintain stability from Moab to
Salt Lake. These child support adjustments continued from the October 2007
'Order' to the November 18, 2008 Hearing which finally calculated child support
for Petitioner at $351.00 per month, even though Respondent was declared
unemployed. Accessory information is identified in the record whereas
Petitioner's income was reduced to $43,000 annually and Respondent's was
adjusted to $3633.00 per month at the July 9, 2008 'Trial.' (Ex. 7 'Trial' p. 14,
last paragraph). This inconsistency and impulsive reductions in itself had
exasperated Respondent in her defense of and maintenance in supporting the
progress of the move. Hill v. Hill, 841 P2d 722 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). Respondent
had not held a position for even two months with the firm in Salt Lake City,
whereas the Court immediately recalculated child support. Petitioner had reduced
7

his income from $60,000 in August 2007 to $43,000 in July 2008, in less than a
year. Respondent raised her income from $883.00 to $3633.00 per month in less
than a year. Hudema v. Carpenter 290 P.2d 49 f 1, (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). (Utah
Court of Appeals § 78B-12-108 (1), § 78-12-203 (5)(a), (Ut. R. Evi. 37 (c)(f)).
None of this was equitable accordingly within the existing 'Order' which stated
child support would be re-calculated 'annually.' (Ex. 3 'Findings-Olsen' p.4
(15)), (Ex.3 'Findings-Halls' p.6 (12)). The immediate one-sided and unfair
unethical adjustment of child support created a severe impact on the child and
Respondent, in less than 6 months' time. Had the trial court judge adhered to its
initial 'Order' indicating that child support would be adjusted annually in
February; Respondent may not have endured the continual roller coaster of
events, thereafter. Kasmicki 468 P.2d 818, (Wyo. 1970). Doyle v. Doyle 221
P.2d 888, (Ut. Ct. App. May 2010).
Relocation was contemplated and written into the decree and Respondent
maintains it is not a valid argument, in all attempts. (Ex. 3 'Findings-Olsen' p.7
(30), (Ex.3 'Findings-Halls' p. 10 (27). For example, Respondent was not present
in Moab, with her Child, for (3) months prior to Petitioner's filing of his 'Verified
Petition For Paternity.' Doyle v. Doyle 306, 313, (Ut. Ct. App. 2009). (Ex.14 p.l
f 1, last sentence), (Ex. 15 'Findings' p.3 (5), ( U.R.C.P. 4-903 (5), (5)(c), (Utah
Supreme Court 'Memorandum' 'New Custody Evaluation Procedures').
8

On the contrary, the most impressive change of circumstance was the change
of custody from Joint Legal to Sole for Petitioner. It is predicated and accredited
that a general practice for most trial court judges to allow a discretionary period
of, minimally a year to pass, before altering an existing 'Order' in which they
implicated. This presumes the faith and accountability of all parties involved to
optimistically attain a 'workable' environment, based on the 'Order.' This allows
for preservation, with respect to the trial court judge's original assessment for an
opportunity of a prospectus outcome. (UCA § UCA 30-3-10.4 (2)(c), (3). In this
case, (4) months passed when another hearing/trial was scheduled, and another,
and another, and another, and another. Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d at 5354, 738
P2d 624, *627, (Ut. Ct. App. 1982). Then we arrive at the February 20, 2009
'Trial' that casted custody to the other side of the spectrum from the parents'
custodial parental position's throughout the child's life thus far? (Ex. 15,
'Findings' p.9 ^[48, p.l 1 (B), (C), (D)). Becker v. Becker 649 P.2d 608, (Ut. Ct.
App. Dec. 10, 1984), (UCA § 30-3-10 (l)(a)(ii)(iii)(iv), (2), (4)(b), (5), (UCA §
30-3-10.3 (1), (7), (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (l)(c), (3), (5).
It is described throughout 'Appellant's Brief that Joint Legal Custody was
unworkable under the 'new' circumstance of the Respondent's move to Salt Lake
City that was already written into the order. Furthuremore, it is exaggerated
throughout all the trial court's 'Order's that Petitioner had spent up to 40% of
9

time with the child. (Ex. 15,' p.3 (9), p.4 (10-12)), (Ex. 14 p.2 f3, 'Father
correctly notes that this move has made the generous parent-time schedule agreed
to in August 2007 impossible to follow,' p.4 ^|2, 3rd sentence, 'Following that
schedule, Father would be with Ariann about 40% of the time'). It was
embellished by the court that Petitioner had participated heavily in the Child's
life. It was also noted that Petitioner was not always available to care for the
child and that extra discretion should be catered to him while he was away,
similarly when Respondent moved to Salt lake City. Childs v. Childs 967 p.2d
967 942 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998), (Ex. 3 'Findings-Olsen' p.5 (18), 'Findings-Halls'
p.7 (14)), (UCA § 30-3-33). In both trials, Respondent stipulated to Petitioner's
request of additional parent time for the benefit of the Father/Daughter
relationship. (Ex. 14, p. 2, p.4, %29 last sentence), (Ex.8 'Order' p.2 (3). A
'change in circumstances' had not occurred as much as Petitioner would like to
have the Court believe that to be true. There is simply not one factor of 'change
in circumstances' from Ariann's perspective, or the Mother's material life, or the
Court's to necessitate a change of custody in the childs' (4 1/2 ) years, thus far.
(Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d at 53-54).
There were two significant changes that occurred when Respondent moved to
Salt Lake City, such as the scheduling of excessive court dates and perpetual
reductions in child support from the October 2007 'Order.' It was evident at that
10

time that Petitioner was not present in the child's life as the Court is so
convinced. (Ex. 14, p.l f2, last sentence), (Ex.15 p.3 (5), (6)), (Ex. 3 TindingsOlsen' p.5 (10), p.7 (14). Regardless, Respondent stipulated to an equal amount
of visitation for Petitioner as when Respondent had lived in Moab, and when
Respondent moved to Salt Lake. Stevens v. Collard 837 P.2d 593, (Ut. Ct. App.
1992). (Ex.14,' p.6 ^|1, last two sentences). It was obvious to the Court that
Petitioner could afford all transportation costs at one particular court date. (Ex.7
p.l 1 'Trial,"Ms. Globis is not to pay for the travel expenses,' 'Mr. Child is to pay
for the travel expenses'). It was also obvious to the Trial Court that Petitioner
could afford to pay Respondent's attorney fees in between court dates. (Ex.7
Trial' p. 12 '4-29-08 Filed: Order: Re: Verified Motion for Renee Globis for
award of Attorney fees.') However, one month later the trial court judge revoked
the award of attorney's fees based on Respondent's 'brand new employment' and
proffered another reduction in child support, per month, in 2008. (Ex. 8 'OrderHuegely' p.2 (3)). This is just another inaccurate finding that is proved by the
inconsistency as in stated in the 'Minute Entry,' Trial,' 'The court will allow Mr.
Child's to deduct $438 at $50.00 per month.' Petitioner addressed the court with
visitation and child support issues insistently in one years' time promoting failing
progress and persecuted Respondent from moving from Moab. This eventually
evolved to Petitioner's 'Order for Modification of Custody' in February 2009.
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Hutchinson v. Hutchinson 849 P.2d 38, 41, (Ut. Ct. App. 1982), (Ex.7 p.13 '5-0608 Hearing').
If the Trial Court was correct in predictating a substantial change of
circumstance, it is debatable whether the Trial Court made a correct assessment
on the best interests of the child given the April 27, 2009 'Order' from Joint
Legal Custody to Sole Custody. Dunkin v. Hinich 442 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Min.
1989). Stanley v. Deborah 124 N.H. 138, 467 A.2d 249, 251, (1983). Charles v.
Stenlik 744 A.3d 1255, 1257, (Pa. 2000), Same. (Ex. 14,' p.5 f3, sentence 1 &
sentence 3), (Ex.7 p.14 '7-10-08 Trial') (Ex.14 p.l 112, first sentence. (UCA §
30-3-10), (UCA § 30-3-10.7). In raising the concern that this case was not
properly bifurcated for evaluation of the child's best interest after assessing that
there was a substantial change in circumstances. For example, that 'Order' was
objected to for 'Reconsideration' by Respondent's Attorney immediately. (Ex. 7
p.20 '4-28-09 Filed: Objection to Proposed Order and findings,' '4-22-09 Filed:
Motion for Reconsideration Re: Change of Custody and Memorandum in
Support'). Both, Respondent's Attorney and Petitioner's Attorney failed to
request a custody evaluation at that time or prior to that time, which would have
been in the childs' ultimate best interest. Resulting in failure of applications of
Utah Rules Civil Procedure and Utah Code Aannotated. In and for lacking
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direction for the case, in accordance to Utah State Law and Constitutional
provisions. (Ut. R. App. 33).
Instead, this Appeal was filed.
2. The prolific evidence contained in the record that imposes the best interest of the
child overtly caters to Respondent's care of the child and introduces harassment
charges. For example, there were (7) witnesses permitted to testify on behalf of
Petitioner, and zero in support for Respondent's testimony at the February 2009
trial. (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (5), (UCA § 30-3-10.3 (6), (UCA § 30-3-3 (2). It is
argued that Respondent was a failure at managing money, (Ex. 7 p.3 f 1), but it
does not argue that Respondent failed at providing adequate or unhealthy living
circumstances for herself and the child. It was proved that Ariann was in a
Montessori Pre-school for a period of consistently 6 months before the child was
refused at the school for lack of one half of one months' payment because of the
overwhelming infiltration of phone calls and letters requested of the school to
provide Petitioner and/or Respondent with ammunition detrimental for the child
in this case. The director of the pre-school, Irma Martinez, was not at the trial,
nor on the witness list. Accepting testimony that was unchallengeable is a
violation of Utah Rules of Evidence, and that was not offered for review prior to
the trial for opposing counsel to comment or prepare. (Ex. 14 p.6, 7, 8).
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(U.R.

Evi. 43 (a), (b), 103 (a)(1), (d), 601(c)(l)(2), 602, 807(c), 902, 1002, 1003). (Ex.
14p.3f2).
At the February 2009 trial, the court permitted evidence that implicated
Respondent's character by excessive questioning of material in which Respondent
had no prior knowledge. (Ex. 18 'Exhibit List,' February 23, 2009). In addition
to witnesses that had testimonies showing favoritism for Petitioner, there was no
first hand contact that existed between Respondent and the witnesses for several
months and even years prior to testifying against Respondent or for Petitioner.
Which, in turn caused the court to rule in the April 27, 2009 'Order' that
Respondent was 'an unreliable witness,' as convinced by estranged testimonies.'
An excessive amount of time was spent gathering allegations for Appellee's case
with Respondent, (U.R. Evi. 37 (c), (f), 43, 103 (a), 608, 611, 701, 806). and
damaged the perception of the Mother's ability to pay. The child's future
attendance at the pre-school was, then, effectively (U.R. Evi. 611) destoyed and
complicated the effort of a successful and respectable relocation for making
progress in life after the move to Salt Lake City. (Ex. 14 p.3 f 1 & 2). Huish v.
Monroe 191 P.3d 1242, (Ut. Ct. App. 2008), Opinion. Fontenot v. Fontenot 714
P.2d 1131. The consistency of the Child's visitation with Petitioner continued
after Respondent moved to Salt Lake City. FN3 Shiugi v. Shiugi Supra. U. S. S.
Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed.2d 18 (1976). Mathews v. Eldridge 924 U.S. 319, 333, 96. (Ex.
14

7 p. 14 '7-10-08 Trial'), (Ex. 14 p.4 | 2 last sentence), (Ex. 15 p.6 f 25 & 28)).
This was not argued; this was fact; except for the additional exaggerations of
'time' with the child. The previous 'Orders' have overwritten Petitioner's
involvement with the child from day one, and of pregnancy. (Ex. 14 p. 10(3)),
(Ex.15 'Findings' p. 3(5)(6), p.4 (10)(11)), (UCA § 30-3-10 (l)(a)(iii).
It was identified in the 'Memorandum Decision' that it may not have been
wise to have the child. The decision to have a child or to have an abortion is
ultimately up to the Mother. The Father had made a decision to have a sexual
relationship with Respondent for well over a year before the pregnancy. (Ex. 14
p. 1 .f 1). Despite Petitioner's opinion of the Respondent, as a good or sufficient,
enough Mother to decide to have a child; a child was bom. Kasmicki 468 P.2d
818, 823, (Wyo. 1970). It is clear that the Petitioner cares for the child. It is
recognized that Petitioner may be abusing the Respondent for having the child.
(Ex. 15 'Findings' p.9 (45), p.l 1 (11)). There are several guidelines of the State
of Utah to address two parents who were never married. Davis v. Davis 749 P2d
647, 648 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). (USG § 30-3-3), (UCA § 30-3-5), (UCA § 30-310). The Trial Court has elected that those guidelines do not apply in this case for
blasphemous reasons; such as: lack of a custody evaluation or expert witnesses,
refusal to order a parenting plan with the Petition to Modify, no order of
counseling, no order of dispute resolution, and no mediation. (Ex. 14 p.l 1 (4),
15

12). (UCA § 30-3-10.3 (6)(7), (UCA § 30-3-10.4, (l)(c), (2(c), (3)).
Respectively Petitioner argues that UCA § 30-3-10.4 (4) does not apply requiring
a parenting plan for the request for modification, however, the mute point is that
Respondent maintained full sole legal and physical custody of the child, before
the August 2007 'Order' of Joint Legal Custody that was stipulated to by both
parties. (Ex. 14 p.2 f2, The parties agreed that Mother would have primary
physical custody.' The court eventually determined that joint legal custody
should be awarded.'), (UCA § 30-3-10(3). Resulting in Petitioner's complete
lack of providing a Parenting Plan throughout his award of 'Verified Petition for
Paternity'. (UCA § 30-3-10.3 (1)(7)), (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (l)(c)(iii)), (UCA § 303-10.7). All of these options have been viable options for parents to work out
their issues for the child's best interest. Instead, of a situation where a four and
half year old girl must endure the impact of not having her Mother in her life
anymore. (Ex. 15 'Order' p. 1 (2), p.2 (3), p.3 (8)). Petitioner is Australian, not a
U.S. citizen, and it is the Mother's fear that her child may disappear to another
country given the courts' permissions. (Ex. 3 'Findings-Halls' p. 11 (30)). It is a
disturbing determination for the Trial Court to have placed this child into a
situation where the Father has complete control over the Mother and Child
relationship legally and physically. (Ex. 14 p.9 (4), The court recognizes that
father could have been less critical and more supportive without abandoning his
16

responsibilities to Ariann.'). It is the Authority of the court is to observe the
child's best interest. Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d 51, 55, (Construing UCA § 30-35). Permissibly, the trial court had had 3 I/2 year's of the Childs' life in hand, in
making the assessment for the October 2007, 'Order' that commemorated a 'Joint
Legal Custody' status for Respondent and Petitioner. Pusey v. Pusey 728 P.2d
117, 120, (Ut. Ct. App. 1986). Prayzek v. Prayzek 776 P.2d 78, *82. Kramer v.
Kramer 738 P.2d 624. (Ex. 15 'Finding' p.2 ^1), 'The parties' agreed that Mother
would have primary physical custody and that joint legal custody should be
awarded.'). Then, changed their' decision, less than a year later after several
disruptive court appearances and threats of allegations to promote a 'change in
circumstance.' (Ex. 15 'Findings' p.2, ^[1, 'The parties indicated that they had
reached a settlement, but an order was never filed because shortly after the
hearing, the Respondent had lost her job and her counsel refused to enter a
judgment because the facts had changed' (1), 'The Father and Mother were joint
parents of a child, Ariann, born in August 2004'), (Ex. 8 'O'rder' p.2 ^[5), (Ex. 7
p. 14 'Trial' p. 15 '9-29-08 Filed Notice of submission of proposed order, 4-29-08
Filed: 'Order Re: Petitioner's Petition to Modify order'), (Ex. 14 p.5 %29 'No
judgment based on the July 2008, stipulation was ever entered.' 'Counsel for
Mother refused to prepare a judgment because the facts on which it was based
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had changed.'). Explicitly, Father and Mother were, on the contrary, joint legal
custody, of Ariann. (U.R.C.P. 52 (d), (U.R.C.P. 59 (a)(1), (3-7)).
In consideration of the question at hand:
a. Did the move from Salt Lake City have a significant affect upon the child and the
Maternal relationship? Her home and her school changed, but her life with her
Mother and Father held the same consistency, and her time with her Father.
(UCA § 30-3-10 (a)(ii). Huish v. Munro 191 P.3d 1242, (Ut. Ct. App. 2008).
Hudema v. Carpenter 989 P.2d 491, 497-98, (Ut. Ct. App. 1999). Larson v.
Larson 888 P.2d 719, 722, (Ut. Ct. App. 1994).
b. Was the child's life affected at all by the windfall, or by the loss of Respondent's
inheritance? Respondent was in debt prior to the inheritance and before the birth
of the child, then Respondent paid all debts with the aid of the inheritance and
supplemented her income with dedication to be a 'stay at home Mom,' then, debt
was accumulated, again. (Ex. 14 p.3 ^fl). Respondent was ordered to pay Greg
Child (Petitioner/Appellee) $5100.00 for loans contained within the Oct. 30, 2007
'Order.' (Ex. 3 'Order-Halls' p. 6 (15)), (U.R.C.P. 54 (b), (UCA § 30-3-5).
Respondent spent a large portion of the inheritance specifically described in the
April 27, 2009 'Order and Findings' on surviving in Moab with an unsupported
Father. However, it is presently being overlooked that this inheritance which
qualified a substantial change of circumstance was identified abstractly in the
18

October 30, 2007 wOrder and Findings,' as well. Hogge v. Hogge 738 P.2d, 624,
*628. In universal references, this has no substantial value on Motherhood
capabilities regarding the child's welfare, or 'Best Interest.' (UCA § 30-3-34).
c. Is it in the best interest of the child to have only one overbearing parent, instead
of two that maintain a respectful relationship, or at least try, and in some cases by
law, forced to try by law and 4in accordance;' except in this case.

(UCA § 30-3-

11.3), (UCA §30-3-12).
d. It is recognizable in the authorities that a child's best interests are served first
with meaningful contact with both parents. (Shiugi v. Shiugi, Supra.), (UCA §
30-3-10), (UCA § 30-3-10.4). Credit is given to family, friends, schooling and
community. In this case, Petitioner served minimally in the child's life, but
extensively in the Court's Life of this Child, thus far; with the Respondent as
primary caretaker of the child. (UCA § 30-3-10 (iii)). Neither parent is from
Moab, or has ever had relatives in Moab, so that is not a consideration. Hudema
v. Carpenter, 290, (Ut. Ct. App. 1999). (Ex.14 p.l %2), Contradicting, (Ex. 15 p.2
(3), p.3 (5)(6)). The final factor of schooling, community, and financial
opportunity should be recognized as a very mature choice for Respondent to have
moved to Salt Lake City in effort to give the child expanded educational
opportunities approaching the age of five years old, and a more convenient access
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to her family in Chicago, by and through her Mother, (Respondent). (Fontenot v.
Fontenot 714 P.2d 1131).
e. It is recognized by the court that the Respondent had several places to live and
several jobs, and that this was not in the child's best interest. The best interest of
the child could have been protected for the Respondent and the child had the trial
court relieved the Respondent of even a few Court dates and offered a time period
for stability to get established. A move for any family is difficult enough given
the economic and emotional stresses' enduring among our society. As the Trial
Court lodged the ambush of Court appearances and litigation for Respondent in
support of Petitioner's unethical and immoral allegations denying Respondent of
an opportunity to make better her situation to Salt Lake City financially, it is
prevelant that this instability caused by Petitioner's actions and the Court's
'Orders,' resulted in unlawful determinations that were not to the benefit of the
Child. (UCA § 30-3-12), (UCA § 30-3-32).
f. Was it to the child's benefit to have on-going reductions in child support in this
case to an amount of $351.00 per month, from $502.00 per month, as indicated in
the 'Record,' with the references provided in 'Appellant's Brief (Utah Court of
Appeals §78B-12-108,(1)).
All of these points of the child's best interest truly rely on which parent is
most likely to be good, honest, hard-working, ethical, positive, dedicative,
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supportive, and loving. Appellant believes a good evaluation of the child's best
interest concerning the Respondent's charges (allegations) are dispositive with
her attempts to approach a better life for both Respondent and Child.
Concludingly, they are conducive in showing that Petitioner evaded his respective
responsibilities to the Mother/Daughter relationship. These aspirations of a
promising home for Mother and Child in Salt Lake, and extended time with her
Father in Moab were abandoned due to the change of custody.
With all due respect, this child, this case would not exist had Respondent
decided to have an abortion. Petitioner is noted as not approving and/or wanting
the Child in formative years.' However, in itself, these are formative years right
now that Respondent is crying out for the permissions to participate in the Child's
life. (Ex. 14 p. 10 (4)). By law, the Mother is not required to provide a parenting
plan in her decision to have a child. The law should not recognize the wants of
the parents, but the necessities of the Child to have both parents' equitably
involved, as was, supported in the 'Order' of October, 2007; though, it was never
enforced. (UCA § 30-3-35).
Respondent did not give up her parental rights, or abuse them.
This case is an extreme cry for Mother's to fear. The decision a Mother holds
to have a child and be granted the opportunity to the right to exist and be relevant
in that child's life has become an absolute struggle beyond justifiable reasoning.
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Regardless of how many jobs the Mother has retained, or places she has lived in
and throughout the child's life. This decision for Respondent to have the baby
may seem morose to the Father. However, Mothers are Mothers because they
chose to have a child and endure all consequences at best, and under unforeseen
circumstances.' The essence of this type of assumption of'instability' is in itself
oppressive to administer to a single Mother, and release custody to a father that
promoted it. (Exhibit 15, 'Findings' p.3 (7), (Ex.14 p.9 (4), 'Mother was clearly
not comfortable of father's monitoring of her activities in Moab.'). Respondent
prays that the best interest of this child will be served considering the Respondent
has pursued a better quality of life, and a more positive outlook for the child to
have for her future. Kramer v. Kramer 738 P.2d 624. It is clear that Respondent
bore the child with every intention and sacrifice of providing, nurturing, caring,
loving, the child to the best of capabilities, consistently apprising the Father of a
an opportunity to be involved, and always trying to correct the inadequacies of
not being a perfect human being. As a race, we strive for this perfection, but if
we did not endure the imperfections of our parents, how would we ever learn to
grow better and surpass those imperfections, as children.
3. The Respondent's request for Attorney's fees is applicable in this case given the
disproportionate amount of legal fees involved in comparison to the Respondent's
loss of income, assets, and inheritance, and the Petitioner's deep pockets, given
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his ability to afford all the attorney expenses while reducing his income from over
$60,000 a year to $40,000 in 2008 and 2009, regarding the last reduction in child
support. Childs v. Childs 967 P.2d 942, 945, Cert Denied, 982 P.2d 88, (Ut. Ct.
App. 1998). (UCA § 30-3-10 (4)(a)), (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (5)), (Utah Court of
Appeals § 78B-12-203 (4)(a), (5)(b), (7)(b)). In both instances, the Trial Court
failed to recognize that this loss of income and inheritance was impressionably
due to the failure of support from Petitioner. It is apparent that Respondent made
all attempts given a great amount of liberty and effort to provide a stable home for
the child in Moab, for Petitioner's access; but, foremost, provisions were gifted to
Petitioner from Respondent for the Child. In referencing, Respondent agreed to
petitioner's visitation requests, as well as, selling Respondent's land to pay
attorney's and Petitioner $5100.00. When the Respondent decided to move from
Moab the Court frowned upon that move, for the sole reason of Petitioner's
allegations that led exhaustible court dates to kill the effort. Respondent did not
get legitimate support from the Petitioner in Moab or Salt Lake City. The child
did not lose visitation or her routine with either parent in Moab or Salt Lake,
under Respondent's care. This point is important because it recognizes that the
Respondent was not abusing court orders or failing at providing for the child in
any form quantative for the trial court to persist with court appearances. Hogge v.
Hogge 649 P.2d at 53-54, (Ut. Ct. App. 1982). (Ex. 14 p. 10 (1)). The Trial Court
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issued a very distinct order that would consider awarding attorney fees for the
prevailing party in disputes. (Utah Court of Appeals § 78A-12-103 (2)(c), (Supp.
2009), (Conclusion). Thus far, Respondent had prevailed at times, and the Court
did not support their'October 30, 2007; 'Order and Findings.' Connell v.
Connell—P.3d—, 2010 WL 2105190, (Ut Ct. App., 2010), (Utah Court of
Appeals § 78B-12-102(7), (Supp.2009), Hill v. Hill 841 P.2d 722, (Ut. Ct. App.
1992), Doyle v. Doyle 221 P.2d 888 (UtCt. App. May 2010). (UCA § 30-3-3).
(Ex. 7 'Trial' p. 14 'Respondent asks for her attorney's fees.'), (Ut. R. App. 30),
(Ut. R. App. 33).
CONCLUSION
Appellant, hereby, respects and requests the Court of Appeals to reconsider
the trial courts' determination in favor of Appellant for all the considerations
unjust presented. The parental bond and nature of the child's relationship with
her Mother has suffered emotional, psychological, physical and financial
destruction through legal berating causing severe financial impacts that have
inhibited the on-going healthy relationship that Respondent had maintained with
the child. Ariann should not be a ping-pong in her parents' struggle with the
distribution of parental rights.' Stability is first recognized with the parent who
outweighs the bond with the child. The trial court failed to make an assertion
which parent the child has spent the most time or better suited in maturity by
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offering no expert witnesses, instead contradictory findings. Presumably the goal
for the child's best interest to be recognized by factual findings contained within
the record, it should be obvious to the court that Ariann has spent the majority of
her life with her Mother. The factual basis of Ariann's relationship with her
Mother had not changed from August 2007 to February 2009. Respondent's
financial condition changed somewhat, Respondent's home changed, and
Respondent's relationship in parenting with the Petitioner worsened. The avenue
that the court directed for Petitioner and Respondent by disallowing negotiation
of their differences about the move to Salt Lake have encouraged a shocking
outcome for the child to be abandoned by her Mother.
Appellant, hereby, prays the Court of Appeals to adhere to the failures of
justice described within this case for the sake of the Mother/Daughter relationship
and the child's best interest. In addition, in preserving the strength of the State of
Utah Rules and Regulations for a Mother to have and maintain equal rights' to
her child with a paternal Father, albeit the imbalance of power contained within
this case. Appellant requests the following resolutions for posturing the 5 year
old child to have a future of maintaining the security of both parents participating
heavily in her life.
1. Primary physical custody to be returned to Respondent. Joint legal custody to be
re-instated.
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2. Mediation (dispute resolution), counseling, and a parenting plan to be ordered to
negotiate parent time, child support, and other relevant issues.
3. Appellant's attorney fees to be awarded for the dishonor of the failure of
appropriate and fair justifications in this case, and for the suffering that Appellant
has had to endure in result.
Dated this 10th day of August 2010
RenWCjlobis^Pro Se Annellalft
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Utah Judicial Code § 78A-12-103 (2)(c)
(2) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and
process necessary:
(c) appeals from juvenile courts.

Utah Judicial Code § 78B-12-102 (8), (9)
(8) "Child support" means a base child support award, or a monthly financial award for uninsured
medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal for the support of a child, including current periodic payments,
all arrearages which accrue under an order for current periodic payments, and sum certain judgments
awarded for arrearages, medical expenses, and child care costs.
(9) "Child support order" or "support order" means a judgment, decree, or order of a tribunal whether
interlocutory or final, whether or not prospectively or retroactively modifiable, whether incidental to a
proceeding for divorce, judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance, paternity, guardianship, civil
protection, or otherwise which:
(a) establishes or modifies child support;
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judgment; or

Utah Judicial Code § 78B-12-108 (1), (B)
(1) Obligations ordered for child support and medical expenses are for the use and benefit of the child
and shall follow the child.

Utah Judicial Code § 78B-12-203 (4)(a), (5)(a-c), (7)(a)(b)
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by subtracting
necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income
and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an
appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those
expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated
to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay
stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year
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unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records
maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer
statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or
overemployment situation exists.
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the
parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the
presiding officer in an administrative proceeding enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for
the imputation.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and
probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications,
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for
persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure

Ut. R. App. 30
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order or
judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial
court or agency to supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the issues
presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the trial court or agency to enter
judgment in accordance with the findings as revised. The court may also order a new trial or further
proceedings to be conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all
questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final
determination of the case.
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless
otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the
judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be executed.
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed,
modified, or affirmed, the reasons shall be stated concisely in writing and filed with the clerk. Any justice
or judge concurring or dissenting may likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the clerk.
The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall constitute the entry of the judgment of the court.
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument, the court concludes that a case satisfies the criteria
set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the case by order without written opinion. The decision shall
have only such effect as precedent as is provided for by Rule 31(f).
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the decision, the clerk shall give notice to the
respective parties and make the decision public in accordance with the direction of the court.
(f) Citation of decisions. Published decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and
unpublished decisions of the Court of Appeals issued on or after October 1,1998, may be cited as
precedent in all courts of the State. Other unpublished decisions may also be cited, so long as all parties
and the court are supplied with accurate copies at the time all such decisions are first cited.

Ut. R. App. 33
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in afirstappeal of right in a criminal case, if
the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or
for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in
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Rule 34. and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the
damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper
is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass,
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing
the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures. (1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for
summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response
to a motion or other paper. (2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages
should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the
basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered
for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. (3) If
requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
U-R.C.P. 4-903 (5), (5)(C)
(5) The purpose of the custody evaluation will be to provide the court with information it can use to
make decisions regarding custody and parenting time arrangements that are in the child's best interest.
When one of the prospective custodians resides outside of the jurisdiction of the court, two individual
evaluators may be appointed. In cases in which two evaluators are appointed, the court will designate a
primary evaluator. The evaluators must confer prior to the commencement of the evaluation to
establish appropriate guidelines and criteria for the evaluation and shall submit only one joint report to
the court.
(5)(C) the relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians;

U.R.C.P. 37 (c), (f)
U.R.C.P. 52 (d)
(d) Correction of the Record. If anything material is omitted from or misstated in the transcript of an
audio or video record of a hearing or trial, or if a disagreement arises as to whether the record
accurately discloses what occurred in the proceeding, a party may move to correct6 the record. The
motion must be filed within ten days after the transcript of the hearing is filed, unless good cause is
shown. The omission, misstatement, or disagreement shall be resolved by the court and the record
made to accurately reflect the proceeding.

U.R.C.P. 54 (b), (c)(1)
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim,
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence
of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject
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to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of
several claimants; and it may, when the justice ot the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of
the parties on each side as between or among themselves.

U.R.C.P. 59 (a)(1), (a)(3-7)
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial, (a)(3) Accident or
surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, (a)(4) Newly discovered evidence,
material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial, (a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice, (a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. (a)(7) Error in law.

UR.C.P. 106
(a) Commencement; service; answer. Except as provided in Utah Code Section 30-3-37,
proceedings to modify a divorce decree or other final domestic relations order shall be
commenced by filing a petition to modify. Service of the petition, or motion under Section 30-337, and summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance with Rule 4. The responding
party shall serve the answer within the time permitted by Rule 12.
(b) Temporary orders, (b)(1) The judgment, order or decree sought to be modified remains in
effect during the pendency of the petition. The court may make the modification retroactive to
the date on which the petition was served. During the pendency of a petition to modify, the
court:(b)(l)(A) may order a temporary modification of child support as part of a temporary
modification of custody or parent-time; and(b)(l)(B) may order a temporary modification of
custody or parent-time to address an immediate and irreparable harm or to ratify changes made
by the parties, provided that the modification serves the best interests of the child.

'Memorandum,' New Custody Evaluation Procedures'
'I. Introduction
Noting that custody evaluations are of varying quality, that high quality evaluations can be
costly, and that waiting for evaluations stalls the legal process, the Judicial Council charged the
Standing Committee on Children and Family Law to "improve the quality and timeliness of
custody evaluations." Having studied the issue in depth, the Standing Committee now presents
substantial revisions to Rule 4-903, "Custody Evaluations" of the Code of Judicial
Administration, as well as these accompanying forms. This memo explains the process
envisioned by the forms, and details the changes made to the rules.
II. Contemplated Custody Evaluation Process
Custody Evaluation forms have been approved by the Supreme Court and Judicial Council to
reduce the need for extensive, formally-prepared evaluations, and to make custody
considerations more accessible to the commissioner or judge on the bench. Any custody
evaluation submitted to the court must address the topics noted on these forms.
The settlement conference procedure is designed to (1) reduce the time and expense of
preparing a written report in cases where this might not be needed, (2) disclose the custody
evaluation findings in such a way that is less adversarial and less damaging to family
relationships, and (3) allow the parties a final opportunity to participate in the fashioning of an
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agreement. It allows the parties to benefit from the insights of the evaluator while still
experiencing a sense of control over the decisions made about their children. Through greater
participation of the parties, it is hoped that future conflict will be reduced. If no settlement is
reached at or soon after this conference, a written evaluation would be prepared and a court date
set. The "Settlement Conference Report" form sets forth the topics to be addressed at the
settlement conference. Toward the end of the settlement conference, and depending on the
wishes of the commissioner or judge, the evaluator may issue verbal custody recommendations/'

Utah Rules of Evidence
U. R. Evi. 37 (c), (f)
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of
any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the
genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may apply
to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making
that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the
request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on
the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by
Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that
party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or
in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).

U. R. Evi. 43 (a), (b)
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise
provided by these rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state. All evidence shall be
admitted which is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court.
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear
the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be
heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.

U.R.Evi. 103 (a)(1), (d)
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
Objection. In case is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record,
stating the specific grounds of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.

U. R. Evi. 601 (c)(1), (2)
U. R. Evi. 602
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding tha
the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but
need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703,
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.

U. R. Evi. 608
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(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of
the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters
that relate only to character for truthfulness.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the
witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.

U.R.Evi.611
(a) Control by the court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment, (b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross
examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and and matters affecting
the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional
matters as if on direct examination, (c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on
the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony.
Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross examination. When a party calls a hostile
witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading
questions.

U. R. Evi. 701
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences
is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

U. R. Evi. 801
(d) Statements which are not heresay. A statement is not heresay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross
examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconcsistent with the declarants
testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the
declarants testimony and is offered to rebut and express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) a party's own
statement in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement in which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or(C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning
the matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the
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relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.

U. R. Evi. 806
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801 (d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted
in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any
evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence
of a statement, or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay
statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity
to deny or explain. If a party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant
as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross
examination.

U. R. Evi. 807
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interest of justice will be best served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.

U. R. Evi. 902
(12) Certified foreign records of regularily conducted activity- In a civil case, the original or a duplicate
of a foreign record of regularly conducted activity that would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if
accompanied by an affidavit or a written declaration by its custodian or other qualified person certifying
that:
(D) the person certifying the records does so under penalty or making a false statement in an official
proceeding.
The affidavit or declaration must be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, would subject the make to
criminal penalty under the laws where the declaration was signed. A party intending to offer a record
into evidence under this paragraph must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse parties,
and must make the record and declaration available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer
into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge them.

U. R. Evi. 1002
To prove a content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph
is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court
of this State or by Statute.

U. R. Evi. 1003
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of
the original.

Utah Code Annotated
UCA§ 30-3-3 (1-3)
VIII

(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or Title 78B,
Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to establish an order of custody, parent-time,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the
costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the
other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the
party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees
or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the
reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, during the
pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of any
children in the custody of the other party.

UCA § 30-3-5 (6), (7), (8)
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and
denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the
prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a
grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to
provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during
the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant
facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or
born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective
standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one
of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been
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conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition
which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient
that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances
that justify that action.

UCA § 30-3-10
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future care and custody of the minor children as it
considers appropriate.
(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and,
among other factors the court finds relevant, the following:
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties;
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, including allowing the child
frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent;
(iii) the extent of bonding between the parent and child, meaning the depth, quality, and nature of the
relationship between a parent and child; and
(iv) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2.
(b) The court shall, in every case, consider joint custody but may award any form of custody which is
determined to be in the best interest of the child.
(c) The children may not be required by either party to testify unless the trier of fact determines that
extenuating circumstances exist that would necessitate the testimony of the children be heard and
there is no other reasonable method to present their testimony.
(d) The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's desires regarding
future custody or parent-time schedules, but the expressed desires are not controlling and the court
may determine the children's custody or parent-time otherwise. The desires of a child 16 years of age or
older shall be given added weight, but is not the single controlling factor.
(e) If interviews with the children are conducted by the court pursuant to Subsection (l)(d), they shall be
conducted by the judge in camera. The prior consent of the parties may be obtained but is not necessary
if the court finds that an interview with the children is the only method to ascertain the child's desires
regarding custody.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child, including allowing the child frequent and
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, the court shall take that
evidence into consideration in determining whether to award custody to the other parent.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), a court may not discriminate against a parent due to a
disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining whether a substantial
change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody.
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding custody or determining whether a
substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody, the parent with a
disability may rebut any evidence, presumption, or inference arising from the disability by showing that:
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's ability to provide for the
physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or other resources available to
supplement the parent's ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the
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child at issue.
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to adoption proceedings under Title 78B, Chapter
6, Part 1, Utah Adoption Act.
(5) This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody,
joint physical custody or sole custody, but allows the court and the family the widest discretion to
choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.

UCA§ 30-3-10.1
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Joint legal custody":
(a) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by both parents, where
specified;
(b) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one parent to make specific decisions;
(c) does not affect the physical custody of the child except as specified in the order of joint legal custody;
(d) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of and access to the child
to each of the parents, as the best interest of the child often requires that a primary physical residence
for the child be designated; and
(e) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the
primary residence of the child.
(2) "Joint physical custody":
(a) means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents
contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support;
(b) can mean equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of and access to the child by each of the
parents, as required to meet the best interest of the child;
(c) may require that a primary physical residence for the child be designated; and
(d) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the
primary residence of the child.

UCA § 30-3-10.3 (1), (7)
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final order of joint legal custody or joint physical custody
is entered both parties shall attend the mandatory course for divorcing parents, as provided in Section
30-3-11.3, and present a certificate of completion from the course to the court.
(7) An order of joint legal or physical custody shall require a parenting plan incorporating a dispute
resolution procedure the parties agree to use before seeking enforcement or modification of the terms
and conditions of the order of joint legal or physical custody through litigation, except in emergency
situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the child.

UCA § 30-3-10.4 (l)(c)(iii), (2-5)
(1) On the petition of one or both of the parents, or the joint legal or physical custodians if they are not
the parents, the court may, after a hearing, modhy or terminate an order that established joint legal or
physical custody if:
(c) (i) both parents have complied in good faith with the dispute resolution procedure in accordance
with Subsection 30-3-10.3(7); or
(ii) if no dispute resolution procedure is contained in the order that established joint legal or physical
custody, the court orders the parents to participate in a dispute resolution procedure in accordance with
Subsection 30-3-10.2(5) unless the parents certify that, in good faith, they have utilized a dispute
resolution procedure to resolve their dispute.
(2) (a) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by either modifying or
terminating the joint legal or physical custody order, the court shall, in addition to other factors the
court considers relevant, consider the factors outlined in Section 30-3-10 and Subsection 30-3-10.2(2).
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(b) The court shall make specific written findings on each of the factors relied upon stating:
(i) a material and substantial change of circumstance has occurred; and
(ii) a modification of the terms and conditions of the order would be an improvement for and in the best
interest of the child.
(c) The court shall give substantial weight to the existing joint legal or physical custody order when the
child is thriving, happy, and well-adjusted.
(3) The court shall, in every case regarding a petition for termination of a joint legal or physical custody
order, consider reasonable alternatives to preserve the existing order in accordance with Subsection 303-10(l)(b). The court may modify the terms and conditions of the existing order in accordance with
Subsection 30-3-10(5) and may order the parents to file a parenting plan in accordance with this
chapter.
(4) A parent requesting a modification from sole custody to joint legal custody or joint physical custody
or both, or any other type of shared parenting arrangement, shall file and serve a proposed parenting
plan with the petition to modify in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8.
(5) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner
designed to harass the other party, the court shall assess attorney fees as costs against the offending
party.

UCA § 30-3-10.7
(1) "Domestic violence" means the same as in Section 77-36-1.
(2) "Parenting plan" means a plan for parenting a child, including allocation of parenting functions,
which is incorporated in any final decree or decree of modification including an action for dissolution of
marriage, annulment, legal separation, or paternity.
(3) "Parenting functions" means those aspects of the parent-child relationship in which the parent
makes decisions and performs functions necessary for the care and growth of the child. Parenting
functions include:
(a) maintaining a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with the child;
(b) attending to the daily needs of the child, such as feeding, clothing, physical care, grooming,
supervision, health care, day care, and engaging in other activities which are appropriate to the
developmental level of the child and that are within the social and economic circumstances of the
particular family;
(c) attending to adequate education for the child, including remedial or other education essential to the
best interest of the child;
(d) assisting the child in developing and maintaining appropriate interpersonal relationships;
(e) exercising appropriate judgment regarding the child's welfare, consistent with the child's
developmental level and family social and economic circumstances; and
(f) providing for the financial support of the child.

UCA §30-3-11.3
(1) There is established a mandatory course for divorcing parents as a pilot program in the third and
fourth judicial districts to be administered by the Administrative Office of the Courts from July 1,1992,
to June 30,1994. On July 1,1994, an approved course shall be implemented in all judicial districts. The
mandatory course is designed to educate and sensitize divorcing parties to their children's needs both
during and after the divorce process.
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules to implement and administer this program.
(3) As a prerequisite to receiving a divorce decree, both parties are required to attend a mandatory
course on their children's needs after filing a complaint for divorce and receiving a docket number,
unless waived under Section 30-3-4. If that requirement is waived, the court may permit the divorce
action to proceed.
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(4) The court may require unmarried parents to attend this educational course when those parents are
involved in a visitation or custody proceeding before the court.
(5) The mandatory course shall instruct both parties:
(a) about divorce and its impacts on:
(i) their child or children;
(ii) their family relationship; and
(iii) their financial responsibilities for their child or children; and
(b) that domestic violence has a harmful effect on children and family relationships.
(6) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall administer the course pursuant to Title 63G, Chapter 6,
Utah Procurement Code, through private or public contracts and organize the program in each of Utah's
judicial districts. The contracts shall provide for the recoupment of administrative expenses through the
costs charged to individual parties, pursuant to Subsection (8).
(7) A certificate of completion constitutes evidence to the court of course completion by the parties.
(8) (a) Each party shall pay the costs of the course to the independent contractor providing the course at
the time and place of the course. A fee of $8 shal1 be collected, as part of the course fee paid by each
participant, and deposited in the Children's Legal Defense Account, described in Section 51-9-408.
(b) Each party who is unable to pay the costs of the course may attend the course without payment
upon a prima facie showing of impecuniosity as evidenced by an affidavit of impecuniosity filed in the
district court. In those situations, the independent contractor shall be reimbursed for its costs from the
appropriation to the Administrative Office of the Courts for "Mandatory Educational Course for
Divorcing Parents Program." Before a decree of divorce may be entered, the court shall make a final
review and determination of impecuniosity and may order the payment of the costs if so determined.
(9) Appropriations from the General Fund to the Administrative Office of the Courts for the "Mandatory
Educational Course for Divorcing Parents Program" shall be used to pay the costs of an indigent parent
who makes a showing as provided in Subsection (8)(b).
(10) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt a program to evaluate the effectiveness of the
mandatory educational course. Progress reports shall be provided annually to the Judiciary Interim
Committee.

UCA § 30-3-12
Each district court of the respective judicial districts, while sitting in matters of divorce, annulment,
separate maintenance, child custody, alimony and support in connection therewith, child custody in
habeas corpus proceedings, and adoptions, shall exercise the family counseling powers conferred by this
act.

UCA § 30-3-32
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote parent-time at a level consistent with all parties'
interests.
(2) (a) A court shall consider as primary the safety and well-being of the child and the parent who is the
victim of domestic or family violence.
(b) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated potential harm to
the child:
(i) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents to have frequent,
meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce;
(ii) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and responsible for frequent,
meaningful, and continuing access with his child consistent with the child's best interests; and
(iii) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in parenting the child.
(c) An order issued by a court pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act shall be
considered evidence of real harm or substantiated potential harm to the child.
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(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37:
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parents.
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the evening the child gets out of
school for the Christmas or winter school break until the evening before the child returns to school.
(c) "Extended parent-time" means a period of parent-time other than a weekend, holiday as provided in
Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(3) and (17),
and "Christmas school vacation."
(d) "Surrogate care" means care by any individual other than the parent of the child.
(e) "Uninterrupted time" means parent-time exercised by one parent without interruption at any time
by the presence of the other parent.
(f) "Virtual parent-time" means parent-time facilitated by tools such as telephone, email, instant
messaging, video conferencing, and other wired or wireless technologies over the Internet or other
communication media to supplement in-person visits between a noncustodial parent and a child or
between a child and the custodial parent when the child is staying with the noncustodial parent. Virtual
parent-time is designed to supplement, not replace, in-person parent-time.
(4) If a parent relocates because of an act of domestic violence or family violence by the other parent,
the court shall make specific findings and orders with regards to the application of Section 30-3-37.

UCA § 30-3-33
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, the following
advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between parents.
(1) Parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-imposed
solution.
(2) The parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the child's life.
(3) Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to attend family
functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and
other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently
conflict with the parent-time schedule.
(4) The responsibility for the pick up, delivery, and return of the child shall be determined by the court
when the parent-time order is entered, and may be changed at any time a subsequent modification is
made to the parent-time order.
(5) If the noncustodial parent will be providing transportation, the custodial parent shall have the child
ready for parent-time at the time the child is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home
or shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time the child is returned.
(6) If the custodial parent will be transporting the child, the noncustodial parent shall be at the
appointed place at the time the noncustodial parent is to receive the child, and have the child ready to
be picked up at the appointed time and place, or have made reasonable alternate arrangements for the
custodial parent to pick up the child.
(7) Regular school hours may not be interrupted for a school-age child for the exercise of parent-time by
either parent.
(8) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the work
schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall
not diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5.
(9) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the
distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time.
(10) Neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to comply with
a court-ordered parent-time schedule.
(11) The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all
significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child is participating or being
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honored, and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully.
(12) The noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including preschool and
daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the
event of a medical emergency.
(13) Each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone number, email address,
and other virtual parent-time access information within 24 hours of any change.
(14) Each parent shall permit and encourage, during reasonable hours, reasonable and uncensored
communications with the child, in the form of mail privileges and virtual parent-time if the equipment is
reasonably available, provided that if the parties cannot agree on whether the
equipment is reasonably available, the court shall decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time
is reasonably available, taking into consideration:
(a) the best interests of the child;
(b) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and
(c) any other factors the court considers material.
(15) Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the court
shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able to
transport the children, to provide the child care. Child care arrangements existing during the marriage
are preferred as are child care arrangements with nominal or no charge.
(16) Each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, and
telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current
address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good cause orders
otherwise.
(17) Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated by the
parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall
have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday.
(18) If the child is on a different parent-time schedule than a sibling, based on Sections 30-3-35 and 303-35.5, the parents should consider if an upward deviation for parent-time with all the minor children so
that parent-time is uniform between school aged and nonschool aged children, is appropriate.

UCA § 30-3-34
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time schedule, the court may establish a parent-time
schedule consistent with the best interests of the child.
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as provided in
Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child. The parenttime schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the
child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that
more or less parent-time should be awarded based upon any of the following criteria:
(a) parent-time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional
development;
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent;
(c) a substantiated or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been made;
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child's well-being during
parent-time;
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter for the child
during periods of parent-time;
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of sufficient maturity;
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections facility, or an
adult corrections facility;
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent;
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(i) the involvement or lack of involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school, community,
religious, or other related activities of the child;
(j) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial parent is
unavailable to do so because of work or other circumstances;
(k) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying regularly scheduled parent-time;
(I) the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents' relationship prior to the
conception of the child;
(m) the parent-time schedule of siblings;
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and
(o) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child.
(3) The court shall enter the reasons underlying its order for parent-time that:
(a) incorporates a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5; or
(b) provides more or less parent-time than a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-335.5.
(4) Once the parent-time schedule has been established, the parties may not alter the schedule except
by mutual consent of the parties or a court order.
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Case Law
Utah law makes clear that a determination of whether substantial and material
changes have occurred is a fact-intensive legal determination that is presumed
valid and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Young v. Young,
2009 UT App 3,14, 201 P.3d 301.
Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, 313
f 22 Huish also argues that the trial court failed to
address certain factors set forth in rule 4-903 of the Code of
Judicial Administration, including the duration of the initial
physical custody arrangement and child-parent bonding, in
determining that a change in physical custody was warranted. In
its Finding 11, the trial court stated: "The Court has
considered several factors, including the factors set forth in
[rule 4-903], in determining custody. Where no findings are
made with respect to a particular factor, the Court finds that
the factor is not significant or weighty in this case."
"Although the court considers many factors, each is not on
equal footing. Generally, it is within the trial court's
discretion to determine, based on the facts before it and
within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a
particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative
importance and to accord each factor its appropriate weight."
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Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ^ 26,
989 P.2d 491. Given the nearly equal parenting time enjoyed by the
parties over the child's life and expert testimony establishing
that the parties were equally involved in raising the child, we
agree with the trial court that, in this case, the factors that
Huish claims are of pivotal significance — the duration
of the original physical custody decree and child-parent
bonding — are not dispositive.
Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App 283, 191 P.3d 1242
Before modifying a custody order, the court
conducts a bifurcated inquiry to determine, first, if there has
been a substantial and material change in the circumstances upon
which the award was based, and, if so, whether a modification is
in the best interests of the child.
Page 498
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4
(1998);[fn6] Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989); Sigg v.
Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 & n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The required
finding of changed circumstances promotes the policies of
preserving stability in the child's relationships and preventing
the burden on the parties and courts of successive adjudications.
See Elmer, 776 P.2d at 602. Consequently, the court generally may
not consider evidence of the child's best interests until it finds
changed circumstances. See Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650-51
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). However, when a custody order is entered
pursuant to a stipulated agreement, rather than a prior
adjudication of the child's best interests, "the res judicata
policy underlying the changed-circumstances rule is at a
particularly low ebb." Elmer, 776 P.2d at 603. See id. at 605.
Tf 23 In this case, the trial court ruled there was a substantial and
material change of circumstances concerning Jackson, Hudema, and
Carpenter. The court based this determination on various factual
findings, including that, subsequent to the original custody
order, both parents had remarried and moved to new communities
separated by a distance that prohibited Jackson's daily contact
with both parents, and Jackson had begun school, making extended
periods of visitation unworkable during most of the year. In light
of these facts, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion
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in finding changed circumstances.
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UTApp 290, 989P.2d49!9 497-98
We will uphold a trial court's decision to modify a divorce
decree if it is within the range of sound discretion.[fnl] See
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). The trial
court determined that the children should be removed from the
custody of their mother and placed in their father's custody if
— but only if— Alicia were to move beyond the boundaries of
Summit County, Utah.[fn2] The focus of the trial court's analysis
and decision, then, was not on the parties' respective
parenting skills.[fn3] Instead, the court's order can only be taken
to mean that the trial court believed that the children's
domicile in Summit County is so essential to their well-being
that removal from that community would be more detrimental to
them than separating them from their custodial parent — the
person who has been primarily responsible for their day-to-day
care for the entirety of their lives. While such a conclusion
is not inherently impossible, a factor of considerable
importance in determining the best interest of children is the
maintenance of continuity in their lives, and removing children
from their existing custodial placement
Page 723
undercuts that policy.[fn4] See, e.g., Hirsch v. Hirsch,
725 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Hutchison
v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982); Nielsen v. Nielsen,
620 P.2d 511, 512 (Utah 1980); In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296,
298-99, 410 P.2d 475, 476 (1966); In re Application of Conde,
10 Utah 2d 25, 29, 347 P.2d 859, 861 (1959); Rosendahl v.
Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870, 873 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,
478-79 (Utah App. 1991); Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah
App. 1990). Therefore, unless there were compelling evidence
that residing in Summit County, Utah, would be better for the
children than allowing them to continue to reside with their
life-long primary caregiver, we would conclude that the trial
court exceeded the exercise of sound discretion in entering the
order before us.
Larson v. Larson, 888 P. 2d 719, 722 (Utah App, 1994)
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In Larson, this court reversed a trial court's custody modification, concluding
that allowing children to remain in their life-long community and
maintain a relationship with their extended family is insufficient
justification for removing children from the custody of their
primary caregiver. See id. at 722, 725-26. Notably, in
Larson there was no evidence of interference with visitation;
in fact, the custodial parent had ffbeen extremely flexible in
coordinating [the noncustodial parent's] visitation."
Id. at 725. This case is therefore distinguishable from
Larson because the trial court here, as in Sigg,
"arrange[d] custody in a way that fosters a relationship with both
parents." See Sigg, 905 P.2d at 917. HANSON v. HANSON, 2009 UT App
365, 368
Stevens v. Collard 863 P.2d 534 (Ut. Ct. App.; 1992)
11) "The former husband's default permitted the trial court to accept the former
wife's allegations as true, for purposes of establishing the threshold issue of a
change of circumstances, and (2) the former husband had become unemployed
and that he had been, by circumstances to move with the child into his Parents'
home, were sufficient to warrant modification, absent any showing of the effect
those changes had on the former husband's parenting ability."
"The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to amend its
'Order' to the trial court. The Court of Appeals should instruct the trial court to
take evidence on all four factors: unemployment, Plantiff s move to his
Parents' home, child visitation, and Plantiff s changed physical circumstances,
so as to establish whether Plantiff s changed circumstances are legally
sufficient to reconsider the custody issue. As, so modified, the Court of
Appeals ruling stands."
Stevens V. Collard 837 P.2d 593 Utah Court of Appeals 1992
[8] "A trial court's decision concerning modification of a divorce decree will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Crouse, 817 P.2d 838.
When, as have, the party seeking modification has failed to establish any
change that would justify re-examination of the presently existing custody
arrangement, we hold that modification of that arrangement, constitutes an
abuse of discretion."
Conclusion
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"However, even under the relaxed evidentiary standards are legally insufficient
to justify re-opening the question of custody."

Becker v. Becker 694P.2d608 Ut. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1984, (No. 19798))
"Accordingly, it is not merely to allege a change which, although otherwise,
does not exist essentially affect the custodial relationship." Id., 649 P.2d at 54
"In other words, if the circumstances that have changed do not appear on their
face to be the kind of circumstances on which the earlier custody decision was
based, there is no valid reason to reconsider that decision. The rationale is that
custody placements, once made, should be as stable as possible unless the
factual basis for them has completely changed."
"We do not find that's an abuse of discretion as the evidence does not indicate
that the custody circumstances of the child or the parenting capabilities of the
Respondent will be affected by the move."
"Therefore, in the absence of a material change in circumstances, it is not
sufficient merely to allege that a child might be better attended in the
petitioning parents' custody."
Stevens v. Collard 837 P.2d 593 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992).
[4] "A party must show, in addition, to the existence and extent of the change,
that the change is significant in relation to the modification sought. The
asserted change must, therefore, have some maternal relationship to and
substantial effect on parenting ability or the functioning of the presently
existing custodial relationship.. .Accordingly, it is not merely to allege a change
which, although, otherwise substantial, does not affect the custodial
relationship."
"This case was remanded from the Utah Supreme Court to the Court of appeals
and asserted the Court of appeals decision."
"Disproved Watkins v. Nelson 163 NJ. 235, 748 A.2.d 558 (779 P.2d 1195,
1197 (Alaska 1989). Requiring unfitness or that parental custody would be
clearly detrimental to the child.
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P. 2d 38, 41 (Ut. Ct. App. 1982)
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"Requiring that unfitness or that no strong mutual bond exists, that the parent
has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and
welfare for the childs,' and that the parent lacks the sympathy for and
understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents' generally."
Dunkin v. Hinich, 44 Z.N. W.2d 148, 153 (Min. 1989)
"(Noting presumption exists, unless parent is unfit, or "grave and weighty"
reasons exist that custody otherwise would not be in the best welfare and
interest of the child.)"
Stanley v. Deborah., 124 KH. 138, 467 A.2d 249, 251 (1983)
"Recognizing parental presumption, but making ultimate determination depend
on child's best interests."
Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. 2000)
(Same)
In Re: Kasmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 823 (Wyo. 1970)
"Recognizing unfitness of best interest of child, but number 252 in proceedings
including children of tender years it is only in very exceptional circumstances
that a Mother should be deprived of the care and custody of her children."
"One overwhelming majority of states do not apply simply the child's best
interests standard, or the ubiquitous, amorphous standard, urged by the
dissenters, if fear "that is taken to its logical conclusion," application of {that}
standard 'could lead to a redistribution of the entire minor population among
the worthier members of the community."
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1991 Ut. Ct. App. 290, y, 989P.2d491
"Mother, who had sole physical custody of child with shared joint legal with
father, moved to increase child support after father moved to another city to
accept new job at higher salary. Father moved to modify custody based on
changed circumstances. The Second District Court awarded sole physical
custody father with structured visitation."
"Trial Court did not err in ruling that there was a sufficient change of
circumstances to warrant a modification of custody. (3)The trial court abused
its discretion in determining that religious compatibility and comparison of
moral character favored awarding custody to Father. (4)It was the court's
discretion to rule that child's interests were best served by awarding custody to
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father because child's strong bond with his father and the increased kinship ties
near father's home."
Davis v. Davis 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988)
f l"At the time of divorce the parties had been married nearly 13 years and had
one child, JZ.
^[2" At the hearing, the parties agreed that James would have custody of JZ. So
the child could remain in the family home."
'The Supreme Court stated that in a custody dispute between fit parents,
"considerable weight" should be given to the identity of the primary caretaker.
Id at 648.
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Ut. Ct. App. 1986)
"Identity of parent with whom child has spent most time pending divorce is
factor to consider in custody decision. Here, because the trial court specifically
found that neither parent has been Drew's primary caretaker during the
pendency of the divorce, and because the balance of factors did not otherwise
tip in favor of the custodial status quo, the holdings in Davis and Praysek are
inapplicable."
Childs v. Childs 967 P. 2d 942, 945 (Ut. Ct. app. 1998) cert denied, 982 P.2d 88
(Ut. Ct. App 1994)
\ 1 "(4)Award of $1000 to mother for attorney's fees was not unreasonable."
Childs v. Childs 967 P.2d 967 P.2d 942 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998)
f l"Brad and Heather were married and had three children. ^[3A custody
evaluation recommended joint legal custody, but suggested Brad not be
awarded primary physical custody, 944, of all three children. fBrad's desire for
custody has been continual and deep in that he adjusted his work schedule so he
could be available for the children. Moreover, Brad has maintained regular
employment and is better able to provide for the children and, with assistance
from his extended family, can provide quality personal; and surrogate care for
his children."
Huish v. Monroe 191 P.3d 1242 (Ui. Ct. App., 2008)
Opinion
"Huish assigns fifteen errors, which for convienience we restate as four: (1)
that her due process rights were violated, (2) that res judicata and issue
preclusion bar the parties' from relitigating custody, (3) tha the trial court erred
in allowing a witness to testify about the best interests' of the child without first
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explicitly determining whether there existed a substantial change in
circumstances warranting a material change in custody; and (4) that the trial
court's 'Findings of Fact' are unsupported by the evidence and its legal
conclusions are erroneous."
u
(5)Trial court could hear evidence of changed circumstances and the childs'
best interests simultaneously provided that it kept its analysis appropriately
bifurcated; and (6)Factors of duration of original physical custody decree and
child-Parent bonding were not dispositive."
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96
"Huish's case in chief (citation omitted). [2][2]^l"The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner."
U.S. S Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed.2d 18 (1976)
"In the context of parental right, '[Due process requires that as parent be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard by submitting testimony herself and bny
witnesses." In re: S.H, 2007 (Ut. Ct. App. 8, f 21, 155 P.3d 109 (alteration in
original)(citation omitted).
Paryzek v. Prayzak 776 P.2d 78, *82
"[In considering competing claims between to custody between fit parents
under the best interests of the child 'standard/ considerable weight should be
given to which parent has been the childs' "primary caretaker" prior to divorce.
Davis 749 P.2d 648 (emphasis added) [4][5]. ^}4, Sentence 4. Therefore,
insofar as the trial court in this case failed to factor in Martins need for stability
and his two and one-half years' in Vladimir's custody prior to trial in its
determination of Martin's best interests, the court erred."* 83Furthure in
reviewing the trial court's actions, "[W]e will not substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court" //substantial evidence supports the factual findings and
there was a proper application of the legal standards. Bake v. Bake 772 P.2d
461 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
Kramer v. Kramer 738 P. 2d 624
"Initial custody was based on the best interests of the children, Utah Code anno.
§ 30-3-10(1984). Custody changes must also be made on the same basis, § 303-5.
Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d 51, 55 (Construing § 30-3-5)
VYIV/

"...but a legal Judge in a change of custody proceeding must necessarily take
into account, in determining the best interests' of the child that proposition that
a child chould not be uprooted from an established well-functioning
relationship, except for strong and good reasons."
738 P. 2d 624, *628
(last paragraph)
"Focusing only on the alleged change of circumstances of one or the other of
the parents may result in great harm to the child. Second and more important,
the requirement is intended to ensure sufficient stability in children's lives to
enable them to develop relationships and a sense of familiarity with their
surroundings that enhance their sense of security and self-identity, enabling
them to find appropriate role models after which to pattern their lives and to
develop the ability to give and receive love, a necessary requirement for
achieving potential as human beings."
738P.2d624, *627
FN3."Of course, even if the decree was essentially conditional and a change in
the non-custodial parents' circumstances does justify re-opning of the custody
question, events during the intervening custody period may have solidified the
childs' relationship with the custodial parent, that the second prong of the
Hogge test cannot be satisfied. "It is entirely proper, in applying the second
prong of Hogge to consider the events and developments which have occurred
in the intervening period of time and "to determine de novo which custody
arrangement will serve the welfare or best interests of the child." Hogge v.
Hogge 649 P.2d at 54. This includes, of course, "the advantage of stability in
custody arrangements that will always weigh against changes in the party
awarded custody." Id. See Moody v. Moody 715 P.2d at 510 N.l.
Fontenot v. Fontenot 714 P.2d 1131
"Although both children enjoyed positive a relationship with each parent, the
bond between the children and their Mother was stronger. The court appointed
expert who evaluated the child custody verified that although both parties' were
capable and loving parents, the plantiff had functioned in the role of primary
parent and security figure to the children. Warm emotional ties between
children and Mother had bonded and were very important to the childrens
physical and emotional well-being." 714 P2.d 1131, *1133.
FN3 Shiugi v. Shiugi, Supra.
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Although, the conduct of both parents has been less than exemplary, there is
substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that the interests
of the children are best served by maintaining their strong bond with the
Plaintiff. By awarding custody to the Mother, both parents are able to maintain
and strengthen their relationships with the children. An award of custody to the
Defendant would result in the disruption of the present close and special
relationship between the Mother and the children. See Hafen 'The
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the
Individual and Social Interests 81, Mich, Rev. 463.
Hogge v. Hogge 649 P. 2d at 53-54
FNl "The "Change of Circumstances" threshold is high to discourage frequent
petition for modification of custody decrees. The test was designed to "Protect
the custodial parent from harassment by repeated litigation and [to] protect the
child from 'ping-pong' custody awards." Id. "
'The rational is that custody placements, once made, should be as stable as
possible unless the factual basis for them has completely changed."
"The trial court was also particularly mindful of the unique role usually played
by the Mother in caring for her children in tender years.' Boels v. Boels (Ut.
CtApp. 1191(1983).
"Principles of res judicata applies to custody modification proceedings."
Connellv. Cornell—P.3d—9 2010 WL 2105190 (Ut Ct App.., 2010)
"The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law."
"The Court of Appeals reviews a trial courts' decision regarding attorney fees
in a divorce proceeding for an abuse of discretion."
"A trial courts failure to provide adequate factual findings as to husbands'
needs, earning capacity, and ability to pay alimony, in support of alimony
award, during divorce proceeding, the trial court found that husband had a
monthly income of $5996, a monthly rent of $752, monthly living expenses for
himself and second wife of $1500, child care costs of $380 per month, the court
referenced husband's declaration, and it attempted to estimate husbands' net
monthy income to the penny after subtracting all expenses. West's UCA § 303-5/
"A trial court's failure to provide adequate findings regarding the statutory
factors for determining alimony is reversible error when the facts that logically
support the findings are not clear from the record. West's 30-3-35"
UCA § 30-3-5 (8)(g)(iii)(A)
"Remand for reconsideration of attorney's fees award to wife was warranted in
divorce proceeding: if the trial court in its discretion ordered payment of
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reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to statutory subsection governing the
establishment of orders, its order should be supported by findings related to
wifes' need and husband's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees,
whereas, if the trial court in its discretion ordered payment of reasonable
attorney fees pursuant to statutory subsection governing enforcement orders, its
order should be supported by a finding that wife substantially prevailed on the
motions for which she sought attorney fees. West's UCA § 30-3-3.
"A court may impute income to an underemployed spouse for purposes of
calculating alimony."
"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible
error unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment."
Remand was required to allow the trial court to rul of wifes' claim for
retroactive child support for the period October 2001, the date the
parties'permanently separated to April 2002. The date husband's support
obligations began pursuant to the court's order, where the wife raised the issue
in her complaint for divorce, the court ordered husband's child support
obligation to begin April 2002 and stated that wife "reserves the right to argue
retroactivity of support," and wife adduced evidence of the trial regarding
husband's failure to pay any support during that time period."
*2[5] ^f7"Third, wife's contends that the trial court erred by denying retroactive
child support and nanny care costs. We review a trial courts' child support
order for an abuse of discretion. See Hill v. Hill 841 P2d 722, 724 (Ut Ct. App.
1992).
"If a trial court considers these factors in setting an award of alimony (child
support, we will not disturb its award absent a showing that such a serious
equity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Bakanowski,
2003 Ut. Ct. App. 357 f 10, 80 P.3d 153 (Internal quotation marks omitted).
"Wife contends that the trial court failed to make adequate factual findings
regarding the third mandatory factor set forth in UCA § 30-3-5, Husband's
ability to provide support. See UCA § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii).
"In addition, an adequate analysis of the factor regarding ability to pay "must
do more than simply state the payor spouses income." Young v. Young 2009
Ut Ct. App. 3 f 19, 201 P.3d 301 (Citation omitted) (Cert, denied 211 P.3d 986
(Ut. Ct. App. 2009). Wife contends that the trial court erred by failing to
enforce its own prior ruling that would have barred husband from claiming the
second wife was unable to work and contribute to his living expenses.
"Remand was required to allow the trial court to reconsider wife's request for
reimbursement of one-half of the child care costs she incurred for years before
all children were in school full-time, proceeding when the trial court relied
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primarily on the ages and corresponding needs of the children at the time the
court issued its decree, when all the children were in school full-time, but wife's
request covered the years of 2003-06, and, in 2003, the parties' youngest
children were two and four year's old West's UCA § 78B-12-214(1). While
the Court of Appeals affords the trial court broad discretion in fashioning
support awards, its findings of fact must show that the court's Judgment of
decree follows logically from, and is supported by the evidence."
Utah Court of Appeals § 788-12-102(7) (Supp.2009)
Conclusion
f 48 "However, the trial court erred in applying a unitary analysis to attorney
fees incurred in establishing court orders and attorney fees incurred in enforcing
court orders."
Hill v. Hill 841 P. 2d 722 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992)
"Child support order will not be disturbed unless their has been an abuse of
discretion; however, failure of trial court to consider and make findings on
statutorily mandated factors is itself a n abuse of discretion. Failure to consider
statutory guidelines when ruling on father's motion for downward modification
of child support obligation was reversible error. UCA 1953, § 78-45-7, 19. We
therefore, reverse the modification of child support and remand for calculation
pursuant to the guidlelines or for findings that justify deviation from them.
UCA § 78-45-7
Doyle v. Doyle 221 P. 2d 888 (Ut Ct. App. May 2010)
"Determination of a trial court in a proceeding to modify child custody that
there has or has not been substantial change in circumstances is presumed valid,
and an appellate court reviews the ruling under an abuse of discretion standard."
West's UCA §30-3-10.4.
"An appellate court reviews a trial courts' legal determinations regarding a
parents' entitlement to child support modification for correctness. West's UCA
§78B-12-10(8)(l),and78B-12-301.
"An argument is inadequately briefed, and thus an appellate court will decline
to consider it, if it wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support it."
"Law of the case does not go so far to prohibit a judge from catching a mistake
and fixing it."

